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Introduction
The (post)crisis challenges faced by European economies involve also a change of 
the role to be played by the state and its administration. There is an ongoing debate on 
the limits of state intervention and the effectiveness of market mechanisms. The eco­
nomic slowdown and financial turbulences have boosted the role of governments in the 
economy, “[...] who have become more active in economic policies [...] and are moving 
away from a hands-off approach to economic growth and development that had pre­
vailed previously” (IIAIssues Note, 2013, p. 3-4). This trend reflects building-up com­
prehension about the costs of unregulated market forces. Active yet clearly defined 
state role in economy seems desired for ailing European economies to stop their demise 
(Nowak, Rye, 2013). New economic policy should subtly nudge the economy (Alek- 
sy-Szucsich, 2012). Scientific and public discourse seeing national states are simply 
one of many economic actors in international relations seems losing its validity 
(Halizak, 2012). Financial crisis has verified these theses, however, no triumphant re­
turn of state shall be claimed. Despite dominating impressions, “crisis has not induced 
any structural effects with respect to state interventions in national economies” (Szala- 
vetz, 2015). There has been no radical department from prevailing neo-liberal ideology 
and practice, only the approaches to industrial policy were reinforced. “State activism 
has never receded: rather, it has taken different forms while continuously adapting to 
changing environment and new challenges” (Weiss, 2012). Already before the 2008 state 
interventions has been favoured due to peculiarities of international production networks 
and existence of fragmented Global Value Chains (GVC), blurred borders between na­
tional and foreign, growing role of intangible assets or the threat of middle-income trap 
faced by some economies (Szalavetz, 2015). Since the 2008 crisis we can observe in the 
global political economy the “post-neoliberal transformation” (Schmalz, Ebenau, 2012). 
Majority of economists still believe in free market competition, but hardly consider gov­
ernment neutrality as the best solution (Chwieroth, 2007). Public intervention is a prereq­
uisite for the recovery of European economy (Cohen-Setton, 2014). Existing stagnation 
makes a very strong case for increasing public investments. This is justified by multipli­
ers implying significant correlation between public spending and output as well as by 
the hysteresis assuming that after a shock given economic category might not recover at
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all to its pre-shock levels. One may argue, that given the stimulus packages launched 
shortly after the crisis eruption many governments adopted a neo-Keynesian approach 
(Pontusson, Raess, 2012; Vail, 2014). However, since tax cuts were more popular than ris­
ing public spending, scholars labelled such approach as a form of “liberal Keynesianism” 
(Naczyk, 2014). The renaissance of state interventionism after the crisis can be traced 
back to two major developments: diverging EU p.c. incomes and dwindling willingness 
among policymakers to agree to uniform competition standards (Huether, 2015; Picketty, 
2014). Whereas the need for intervention given social exclusion and inequalities is undis- 
putable the question of its scope and degree remains.
This paper takes stock of recent debate on (post)crisis role of state in economy. First, 
as the background for further discussion contextual framework is outlined. It offers ba­
sic premises warranting state involvement in market processes. Next section reviews 
some of the initiatives adopted in Europe in the aftermath of 2008. Special attention is 
paid to industrial policy. Given the controversies surrounding the state role in economy 
important recommendations and guidelines as suggested in the literature are reviewed. 
Final section concludes and presents the main findings.
Conceptual context
The market and the state are both coordination mechanisms which are imperfect and 
prone to failure (Wolf, 1988). While in principle, the market should be responsible for 
allocating goods, its imperfect functioning makes the state improve things by deploying 
regulatory measures. Its limited role envisages providing certain framework for market 
operation. As it seems the least controversial thing that has justified state interference 
with the economy has been the need to eliminate free market inefficiencies and to ac­
count for social aspects.
Recent financial crisis has demonstrated that governments still seek to steer their econo­
mies rather than surrender to market forces (Clift, Woll, 2012). Political interventions in 
open economies exemplifies “paradox of neo-liberal democracy”. They result from ten­
sions between international market integration and spatially limited political mandates and 
it depicts the “need to reconcile both objectives: facilitate the integration of markets and 
protect the interest of stakeholders within a particular territory” (Clift, Woll, 2012).
When analysing the relation between state and financial market one can distinguish 
an extreme with state's domination called “financial repression” or opposite situation 
labelled “regulatory capture”. Government and its agencies can be seen as “captured”, 
i.e. at the mercy of the financial sector and favouring their private interests over the 
public good. On the other hand, governments are portrayed as abusing the financial sys­
tem to their benefit, simply “repressing” the free functioning of financial markets 
(Monnet, Pagliari, Vallee, 2014). This simple dichotomy is blurred and does not take 
into account the dynamic nature of European ecosystem. Governments, central banks, 
and financial institutions are bound by mutually reinforcing relations. Ties between in­
terest groups and state can be also defined by the reference to lobbying (private sector 
influencing regulators) and “grabbing hand” theory (negative power of governments 
contrary to helping hand approach) (Shleifer, Vishny, 1998). There are two perspectives
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on the role of the government in the market: “the public interest world based on the 
premise that markets can fail so that intervention by a benevolent government is justi­
fied (“helping hand”); and the private interest theory, portrayed by the “grabbing hand” 
recognizing that governments are likely to pursue goals that are different from social 
welfare” (Buck, 2013). Financial sector which grew over-proportionally and dominates 
economy can capture the regulator often in very subtle form, due to heightened com­
plexity, which forces regulators to rely on industry expertise. Thus, the official attempts 
to regulate and stabilise financial market might have detrimental impact on economy 
due to the government’s “grabbing hand”, which results from the capture by private 
sector lobbing. Hence, instead of serving the whole society as predicted by “helping” 
hand approach, state acts on behalf of few (lobbyists) and to their benefit.
Geo-economics -  a relatively new paradigm of international relations -  see eco­
nomic policy as integral part of national security and country’s place on international 
scene as defined by economic strength (Halizak, 2012). “[...] efficiency in economic 
management is beginning to override choices of foreign or defence policy as the pri­
mary influences on how resources are allocated” (Stopford, et. al., 1991). Hence, coun­
tries pursue economic diplomacy, support own firms’ internationalisation and try to 
influence their involvement in global value chains (Wrobel, 2012). Geo-economics 
shouldn’t be make equal to mercantilism, which aims at achieving political goals with 
economic activity. In geo-economics the highest priority and end goal are economic is­
sues themselves. It is also unjustified to identify geo-economics with nationalism, 
which can be categorised rather as autarky and protectionism (Halizak, 2012). 
Geo-economics is the function of relations between state and business, a “mutual ma­
nipulation” (Jarczewska, 2012).
Special role for state is foreseen in what Scepanovic (2013) calls hyperintegration­
ist model. It builds on A. Amden’s (2001) distinction, between independentist model 
and integrationist one. In the earlier, “states maintain a guarded stance towards foreign 
investment and continue to shield domestic capital” (Scepanovic, 2013, p. 170). The lat­
ter assumes that “state, foreign capital and domestic firms form a triple alliance in which 
the state does not set the performance targets directly, but uses industrial policy selec­
tively.” In hyperintegrationist development model crucial role plays foreign capital. This 
implies the necessity to rearrange the relations among key players and sees the state role 
not just in facilitating transfer of technology and skills to local firms but rather in attract­
ing foreign capital towards the most promising activities. Yet, state’s position in 
hyperintegrationist model is more constrained by the international regulatory environ­
ment and while, still “manipulating local conditions to direct foreign investors towards 
domestic development goals, state plays a more auxiliary role” (Scepanovic, 2013, p. 53).
State intervention through a proactive industrial policy and assistance for national 
champions can be supported by three arguments (Sauvant, 2008). These are: increased 
security resulting from reduced dependence on foreign supplies, protection of indus­
tries of strategic economic importance such as those, which create jobs and high added 
value, as well as intervention in sectors characterized by high entry barriers and exter­
nalities. Neo-protectionism arguments comprise a number of ideas, the most important 
of which appear to be strategic trade policies and dynamic comparative advantages 
achieved through industrial policy (Puslecki, 2001; Budnikowski, 2003). The strategic
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trade policy, i.e. the use of various tools intended to assist domestic companies (subsi­
dies) are generally legitimized by the lack of perfect competition i.e. the existence of 
monopolies, economies of scale and mutual international dependencies (Brander, 
Spencer, 1985; Rodrik, 2004). Meanwhile, the development of comparative advan­
tages by means of industrial policy is conceived as a departure from passively accepting 
the existing production structure and attempts to influence such structure and modify 
industrial activities to ensure it best protects state interests (Grossman, Helpman, 
1990). An actual monopoly-based competition, entry barriers and economies of scale 
make free market conditions purely fictitious. In such an environment, businesses form 
clusters, enterprises are internationally dependent, and industrial policy supports the 
development of sectors believed to be valuable for the national economy. Economic pa­
triotism -  specific form of state intervention -  is understood as selective discrimination 
in favour of domestic companies or against “territorially defined outsiders” (Callagha, 
Lagneau-Ymonet, 2014). However, “it goes beyond economic nationalism and can in­
clude territorial allegiances at the supranational or local level” (Clift, Woll, 2012). 
Brenner et al. (2010) argued that in times of decentralized policymaking, with deci­
sion-making authority and funding distributed among various levels of government, the 
nation state does not seem to be the adequate unit of analysis of institutional systems.
Market failures and coordination failures imply central role of indigenous efforts to 
build capabilities. Traditional economic rationales for state intervention have been over 
time enriched by broadly defined systemic or network failures (O’Sullivan, et al., 2013). 
This can be explained by new understanding of innovation dynamics: “infrastructural 
and institutional problems; technological lock-in, path dependency, and transition fail­
ures; the quality of linkages and network configuration failures; learning dynamics at 
the firm, local network, and system levels” all justifying state intervention (O’Sullivan, 
et al., 2013, p. 436).
Crisis has seemingly shifted the “market failure -  state failure” balance to the ad­
vantage of state. It does not mean that government mistakes have been forgotten. State 
failures still happen because of “unrealistic goals, distorted information, systemic irra­
tionality, rigidity and lack of credibility, a mediocre bureaucracy, or inherent limits of 
law” (Schuck, 2014). Neither free market nor pure etatism work well, but only hybrid 
models can pass the test as they assure some rebalancing and reduce asymmetries 
(Wolska, 2013). Contemporary economic theories are embedded in certain circum­
stances and process various doctrines, what only confirms the evolutionary nature of 
economic phenomena (Wolska, 2013). The observed difficulty in coming up with new 
paradigm, which would better reflects recent changes and take into account the com­
plexity of contemporary world, can be explained by the wrong approach whereby new 
problems are being solved with old, inadequate instruments (M^czynska, 2011).
(Post)crisis state interventions -  industrial policy
In general crisis call for more state presence in market processes. This involvement 
shall address the market failures -  moral hazard with excessive risk taking by financial 
institutions expecting to be bail-out in distress, externalities, lack of prudential over­
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sight etc. Thus the regulatory and supervisory role assigned to public authorities. Be­
sides, the growing presence of state materialize via rescue operations -  bail-outs for 
failing banks and stabilizing measures preventing full-blown economic fallout, stimu­
lating growth, and minimizing damages on labour market. Yet, at the same time the 
state role has been curbed significantly at least indirectly by massive austerity pro­
grammes launched almost all over the Europe (Gotz, 2012). Spending cuts can be seen 
in this respect as certain reduction of government impact on economy.
Obviously each European country responded to crisis using own distinctive meth­
ods. Whereas France, favours active state intervention and public investment, German 
“corporate liberalism”, emphasizes the powers and responsibilities of social and eco­
nomic groups (Vail, 2014). Economic patriotism is an endemic phenomenon and recent 
crisis only revive it in the form of “German politicians treating foreign investors as lo­
custs; economically liberal British prime ministers proclaiming British jobs for British 
workers; and America, the archetypal liberal market economy, returning to buy Ameri­
can or French president Nicolas Sarkozy urging French automakers to locate their fac­
tories at home rather than the Czech Republic” (Clift, Woll, 2012).
Idea of neo-Colbertism, has been recalled in association with recent M&A attempts 
in Europe. Alstom acquisition by GE/Siemens or AstraZeneca by Pfizer invoked issues 
of nationality of capital and national interest (Doering, 2014; Veron, 2014). Govern­
ment interventions directed against the foreign takeovers might have become more fre­
quent recently, but they do not seem to be linked to the financial and economic crisis but 
are rather a general phenomenon (Heinemann, 2015).
“Governments frequently turn inwards in times of economic crisis [...] and this time 
is no exception” (Baldwin, Evenett, 2012, p. 232). By erecting some trade barriers, pol­
iticians seek to cushion the blow to disposable incomes, fall of investment and loss of 
jobs. Fragmentation of markets along national lines has been reintroduced in Europe, 
however, classic narrow metrics of protectionism does not suffice now (Evenett, 2012). 
Such approach would miss various innovative measures against foreign commercial in­
terests introduced recently. The highly complex environment of multi-level governance 
in European Union renders classic intervention obsolete (Clift, Woll, 2012). Weiss (2012) 
argues that the current science, technology and innovation (STI) policy pursued in ad­
vanced economies resembles classic industrial policy directed towards infant industries. 
Now these industries lie in the knowledge-intensive sectors, and they do not need 
old-style tariff protection or export subsidies, but “support in the form of R&D infrastruc­
ture and subsidies, intellectual property licensing, innovation-led procurement targeting 
new technologies, and public sponsorship of venture capital funds” (Weiss, 2012, 
p. 30-31). Hence, as claimed by Kee etal. (2013), in the aftermath of the global crisis, it is 
not the overall trade restrictiveness as diagnosed by traditional indicators that has risen, 
but rather a murky protectionism. Although, “hidden” it is gaining attention of the Euro­
pean authorities who seem determined to address it properly (European Commission, 
2011). Crisis made governments to reconsider the philosophy of state intervention and 
some reconfiguration of strategies applied in this respect. Certain repackaging took place. 
SIT opens up wide opportunities for the entrepreneurial states (Szalavetz, 2015).
Particularly from the crisis outbreak there has been a clear trend of expecting more 
from state. Now this, however, requires going beyond old-fashioned instruments aimed
496 Marta Gotz RIE 9 ’15
at picking winners. This means that governments must come up with innovative yet le­
gitimate ways of intervention in the economy while complying with strict rules of the 
game. Attention is directed to industrial policy. It can be defined as steps aiming at al­
tering the structure of economic activity. This includes policies toward sectors, technol­
ogies or tasks with good prospects for national economic growth, improving local 
actors' competitiveness and enhancing national economic performance and societal 
welfare” (Warwick, 2013). Industrial policy can take many forms: from import substi­
tution to export promotion, from infant industry protection to state ownership of enter­
prises in strategic sectors or national champions’ development (Cimoli, et al., 2009). 
One of current approaches towards industrial policy stresses its international aspect 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2103). Measures addressing the international interactions matters 
much because the capacity to interact with global markets and production networks is 
a success factor in itself. Despite cross-country variations, some convergence of opin­
ion regarding modern industrial policies can be spotted: “the importance of manufac­
turing R&D, increased emphasis on engineering skills and vocational education, and 
resource-efficient sustainable manufacturing, and -  following the 2008 financial crisis
-  access to finance for manufacturing-based firms. Highlighted is also strategic role for 
government in supporting the coordination and alignment of systems with increasing 
emphasis on ‘partnership’ with industry, often in cooperation with industrial associa­
tions” (O’Sullivan et al., 2013, p. 434).
Crisis uncovered with all brutality the risks associated with overreliance on the 
service and financial sector and made the case for more balanced sources of growth in­
cluding renaissance of traditional industry. Central element of various initiatives imple­
mented across Europe has been the restoration of industrial base with the aim of raising 
industry share in GDP to 20% (COM 2014,14/2). EU authorities started actively advo­
cating the need for more industry (COM 2014, 614; COM 2012, 582). Over recent 
years Europe has lost much of its potential in favour of Asian fast growing economies 
who were able to attract foreign investors. This has led to significant depletion of Euro­
pean industrial base as main companies ventured abroad quitting operations in Europe. 
With respect to industrial policy European governments have been running different, 
often contradictory, strategies. Some have been focusing on safeguarding a competi­
tive, business conducive framework enabling domestic firms to thrive, others seek cre­
ating and nurturing national champions (Huether, 2015).
Whereas as traditionally assumed state intervention is supposed to address market 
failures, new public action needs to remedy also coordination failures by pursuing clus­
ter policies and public financing of innovative projects (Fontagne et al., 2014, p. 3-4). 
The need for more balanced attitude derives also from changing nature of the industry 
as such since “industry and services are becoming one single entity and boundaries of 
companies are changing with the splitting of the value chains” (Fontagne et al., 2014, 
p. 1). We have industry services, service industry and witness trade in tasks. Industrial 
policy as known so far, as horizontal steps improving business conditions or vertical 
measures targeting selected sectors complemented by addressing market failure in 
R&D is being replaced by approach promoting restructuring and technological dyna­
mism, aiming at correcting market and coordination failures (World Bank, 2015). Inter­
ventions however entail certain risks such as lack of information by public agency, or
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difficulty to discontinue the help. It also imply the problem of political economy of 
public intervention. Given the diversity of business models in EU MS it seems doubt­
ful, whether it makes sense for all countries to aim at increasing the industry share at all 
costs at the same speed, the same way (Heymann, 2013). Although, the ambitious goal 
laid out by the Commission with regard to industry might be not achievable, it sends the 
clear message that industry will remain highly important for Europe (Heymann, 2013).
Recommendations
New industrial policy must be carefully designed (Fontagné et al., 2014). Instead of 
infamous picking winners new approach shall account for proper dealing with innova­
tion assuring intellectual property protection and the need to disseminate know-how for 
the benefit of whole economy. It should safeguard right governance enabling if neces­
sary terminating unviable projects, seek private-public partnerships for investments, 
focus on most competitive innovative clusters and promote training of human capital 
and its mobility (Fontagné et al., 2014, p. 12). Mindful of various risks involved experts 
stress that industrial policy should be about “setting the right framework conditions for 
growth, innovation and jobs” (Dale, Porcaro, 2014). “The credo ‘Europe needs indus­
try’ should be replaced by ‘Europe needs innovative firms that operate in activities with 
a high value-added and participate in European and global value chains’” (Sapir, 
Veugelers, 2013).
R. Hausmann(2014) sees governments’role in economy via well designed procure­
ment procedures. He claims, procurement is figuratively speaking the “goldmine”. 
Most countries possess it, but few can and do exploit fully. By imposing concrete qual­
ity standards government can by its purchases (high-quality products that address 
major national challenge) have a tremendous impact on its country's comparative ad­
vantage. In many cases, the benefits of those solutions will stay for long and positive 
spill-over effects can be set in motion.
“As advanced European economies are caught in trap of meagre growth, low infla­
tion or deflation, persistently high unemployment, debt burden and often lack of com­
petitiveness, governments have to accept responsibility for measures that favour 
investment and increase demand, foster R&D and technological innovation, improve 
education levels and implement active labour market reforms and policies” (Constan­
cio, 2014). Such voices stressing the need for more active engagement of governments 
come from EBC officials even more often. Particularly, the problem of reallocation of 
production factors should be address by state assistance. “There is substantial potential 
to boost productivity by reallocating resources both across sectors and within sectors 
towards the most productive firms” (Praet, 2014).
Bloated budgets in many European countries and looming problem of public fi­
nance solvency have made many governments to adopt often severe measures of aus­
terity policy. Certain state withdrawal or retreat in form of budget cuts has been 
accompanied by additional actions such as selling assets or recourse to other alternative 
financing like leasing. Many governments still have piles of assets -  banks, utilities, 
buildings, land and resources. “Selling some of these holdings could work wonders: re­
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duce debt, finance infrastructure, boost economic efficiency. But governments often 
barely grasp the value locked up in them” (“The Economist”, 11.01.2014). Privat­
isation has also been in vogue recently for many reasons such as: the resumption of 
sell-offs of telecoms, in transport and utilities; catching up processes in CEE, where 
many large firms, including manufacturers, remain still in state hands or reprivatisation 
of financial institutions rescued during crisis. Governments facing the twin challenges 
of reducing public debt and rekindling economic growth, can no longer afford to ignore 
asset optimization (Audier et al., 2014). In advanced countries, nonfinancial assets 
owned by the government account for at least 35% to sometimes 90% GDP. Better 
management of these assets can lead to lower costs, help extract the most value from 
public possessions and add new revenue streams. The significant pressure under which 
are most governments in Europe since the financial crisis of 2008, make them to 
reengineer themselves (Pisani-Ferry, 2015). This would imply better designing of 
spending, prioritising, focusing on strategic areas with long term growth perspectives 
and also more empowering of citizens.
Bearing in mind the failure inclination of both market and state the more adequate 
question is “how to develop innovative and efficient government programmes to pro­
vide public goods and services that marketplace cannot deliver on its own” (Tyson, 
2014). One of the approach may be to design government to the model role of venture 
capitalist. Then its task would be less to plan and implement top-down solutions than 
to invite, asses, endorse, and scale up innovative strategies developed by other entities
-  local governments, businesses, and non-profit institutions.
Financial turmoil of 2008 and subsequent economic bust suggest the need to move 
beyond simple “correcting market failures” towards actively shaping economic sys­
tems. State’s role in the economy should be complemented by alternative views of what 
governments could and need to do in order to stimulate economic development. 
M. Mazzucato (2013) underlines the seemingly neglected truth about the state role in 
fostering the breakthrough innovations for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. She 
debunks “the myth of a lumbering, bureaucratic state versus a dynamic, innovative pri­
vate sector,” and stresses that “private sector only finds the courage to invest after an 
entrepreneurial state has made the high-risk investments” (Mazzucato, 2013). The new 
task for state consist in “bold and offensive shaping the markets”. In the entrepreneurial 
state government is leading the way (http://marianamazzucato.com/projects/rethink- 
ing-the-state).
Conclusions
In the aftermath of 2008 crisis we have witnessed various innovative forms of state 
interventions. Under the aegis of economic patriotism some of them have been hamper­
ing foreign firms the other facilitating domestic business. In many occasions it has been 
simply political rhetoric reduced to declarations. Traditional measures cushioning the 
economic blow have been undertaken as well. The havoc wrought resulted in percep­
tion’s change as to the role the state needs to play in economy. It has forced scholars and 
policy-makers to rethink their approach towards public administration involvement in
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market processes. Keynes became popular again and more government intervention de­
sirable as counterbalance for excessive markets (Giles et al., 2009). State aid in the 
(post)crisis reality still invokes controversies. Documented state failures risks such as 
“grabbing hand” and financial repression on the one hand, and market failures rationale 
such as information asymmetry, multiplier effect and hysteresis on the other are 
weighted against each other. Whereas some approaches tend to argue that state role in 
globalized world is dwindling and governments can play rather auxiliary role, the 
other see crucial (post)crisis revival of more state interventionism as justified by market 
failures.
Success in international competition results usually from state-market symbiosis 
(Ząbkowicz, 2013). Today, it “is increasingly over the rules, norms, and tools of state 
involvement in capitalism itself” (Rediker, 2015). As it seems emerging and controver­
sial, yet apparently also desired model of market capitalism assumes that “the state 
plays a central role in directing outcomes to advance national interests.” This means 
that the term “state capitalism” loaded so far with negative emotions, “crowding-out” 
effects or suspicious sovereign wealth funds does not seem to be valid anymore. New 
“state capitalism” includes more sophisticated state involvement and can be called 
“State Capitalism 2.0”, where governments intervene in markets through subtler tools.
The closer inspection of the relation “state-market” illuminated the need to abandon 
the widespread dichotomy of these two extremes. As a matter of fact there are cases 
when the market dominates and situations where state has an upper hand. Recent cri­
sis-induced developments call for more nuanced approach (Monnet et al., 2014). Cur­
rently the state epitomises not only just government but also various agencies, 
regulatory bodies, supervisory authorities. It is even more than ever supposed to stimu­
late certain activities (innovations), prevent some developments by better supervision 
(banking sector abuses), while at the same time stabilising economy (rescue packages, 
bail-out) and reducing its burden for the society by debt slashing. Tough combination. 
With regard to the state role on the market, no breakthrough, radical change or emer­
gence of new paradigm can be diagnosed. Global economic crisis has not yet led to 
a paradigm shift in economic thinking or growth models in most industrial economies 
(Hay, 2011). There has been, however, visible tilt of attitude towards more state in­
volvement in the economy.
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Summary
This paper showcases a review o f recent approaches towards the state role in the post-crisis 
economy. The background for the analysis is the support and austerity paradox. A state is sup­
posed to stabilise the economy, stimulate growth and prevent abuses by better supervision, and at 
the same time to reduce the burden on society by slashing debt. A survey of the selected literature 
shows that the financial turbulence and recent economic downturn call for more state presence in
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market processes. There is a rationale behind such interventions, although, given the risks in­
volved, a balanced and prudent approach is required. Recommendations in this respect have 
been formulated.
Key words: crisis, EU, state intervention, market failures, industrial policy
Rola państwa po kryzysie -  przesłanki i rekomendacje 
Streszczenie
Niniejszy artykuł proponuje przegląd najnowszych podejść związanych z rolą państwa od 
momentu kryzys, który wybuchł w 2008 roku. Tłem do rozważań jest paradoks oszczędności 
i stymulowania, w jakim  znalazły się kraje europejskie. Od rządów oczekuje się bowiem za­
równo stabilizowania gospodarki, stymulowania wzrostu, zapobiegania nadużyciom poprzez re­
gulacje i monitoring, jak  i konsolidacji fiskalnej odciążającej społeczeństwo. Analiza wybranej 
najnowszej literatury w tym zakresie wskazuje, że kryzys finansowo-ekonomiczny odnowił za­
interesowanie większym uczestnictwem państwa w gospodarce. Choć nie brakuje przesłanek 
dla takiego zaangażowania, związane z nimi ryzyka sugerują potrzebę rozważnego podejścia. 
Omówiono proponowane w tym względzie rekomendacje.
Słowa kluczowe: kryzys, Unia Europejska, ingerencja państwa w gospodarkę, zawodność ryn­
ku, polityka przemysłowa

